In the context of the recent meeting of Indian delegation with that of the Chinese in Russian capital, Moscow, it is important to understand the weight of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the backdrop of the Russia-China relations. Historically, the states of Russia and China grew out of the factions of nomads who settled around Siberia, and Amur river valley. Intermingling of various early tribes around these geographical domains gave birth to the origin of population clusters for the two countries. Prior to 1640, the two countries had little if at all any contacts. From late 1500s to early 1600s the Russians made themselves experts of expeditions across the Siberia. In terms of few areas of contacts between the two neighbours, mainly the Amur river basin, the Turkestan and the southern border of Siberia are important. Invading nomad groups especially the Oirats, a western group of Mongols, became the mode of transmission of ideas, identifications and cultures between Russia and China.

In late ancient times, the trade of luxury goods through the silk routes were able to pay for the trade across the inhospitable regions east of Urals bordering the central Asia. In modern times, between the populated areas of west Russia, extreme East Russia and the Eastern China is a huge disconnecting landmass which keeps Moscow and Beijing farther apart than New York and London. There had been many issues regarding the perceptions of border between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Lake Baikal, Argun river, Stanovoy range and Amur river formed important boundary determinants between China and Russia. In 1689, Treaty of Nerchinsk was formalised between Russians and the Qing ruled China. In this treaty, the area to the north of Amur river as far as Stanovoy range was given by the Russians to China which allowed the trade of Russian goods in China. It was an example of parley of landmass for access to trade. This treaty allowed the Russians the control over the region between Argun river and Lake Baikal. Treaty of Kiakhta opened the caravan trade in Chinese tea for Russian furs across Mongolia, in 1727. It allowed the Chinese to control Xinjiang region. Catherine the great of Russia (late 18th century CE) had infused a longing in Russia to become a naval power with respect to Japan and China. From 1850 to 1864, Qing China was in a civil war with the Shenic Christian theocratic state of Taiping. It was also involved in Opium wars with British -East India Company, the then controlling authority over India. This gave Russians the chance to get back the Amur river region which would allow some relief to the Chinese who were willing to keep peace on the Russian front. In 1858, treaty of Aigun between China and Russia gave the latter the region between Amur river and the Stanovoy range, reversing the treaty of Nerchinsk.

There were numerous other disagreements between Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan in matters related to ethnic, land and water disputes. These three issues, especially the border issue, always had huge potential to complicate the relations between these countries. Shanghai five was formed with heads of states all the previously mentioned countries except for Uzbekistan in 1996 to solve the border issues. Talks which culminated in the formation of Shanghai five resulted in solving these issues to a greater extent. Shanghai five also dealt with matters related to demilitarization of the borders between these five countries. An example of this effort was the agreement signed in 1997 for reduction in the military along the Chinese border with Kazakhstan. Dushanbe summit of Shanghai five in 2000 is noted by the setting up of the council of national coordinators which regularized the coordination between the five countries. The Alma Ata meeting of 1998 and the Bishkek meeting of 1999 stressed the importance on maintenance of security, peace and stability among the Shanghai five participants. These developments came in the backdrop of USA gradually pondering of withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, from which it ultimately withdrew in June 2002.

Withdrawal of USA from the ABM treaty changed the security risk calculus in central Asia and the east Europe. Satellite states of USSR in these regions which became countries started contemplating the possibility of US building the missile bases in the westward aligned countries under Truman doctrine (example-Greece). This further enhanced the prospects of strengthening of the Shanghai five in terms of their aligned goals of creating a platform which would be a counter-balance to US influence in Asia. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai five converting it functionally and structurally into Shanghai six. Subsequently, Shanghai cooperation organization was formed by these countries visibly as a step to counter US impact in the Asia. It was founded as a security, economic and political alliance.
India joined the SCO in 2017 along with Pakistan with the hopes to gain entry into the Nuclear Suppliers group and to sort out border issues with China like the recent episodes of Dokhlam and Ladakh. Belarus, Iran, Afghanistan and Mongolia are the observer states in SCO. It has already been made official member of other three prominent export control regimes- the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology and Control Regime. It has been observed by some International policy experts that the hopes of India could be misplaced given that the SCO has two such nations which have been hostile rivals for India- China and Pakistan. Even the expectation that Russia might take bold intervention steps in India’s favour is far fetched given the strong historical and geopolitical links between Russia and China.

It is a well-accepted fact that the Kremlin under Putin wants to restore Russia to the cold war prominence. This can be done by diversification of the strategic links with as many local powers as possible; hence Russia tries to keep close ties with both India and China. Therefore, in a set up like SCO, Russia can not be expected to lean towards India. This argument would be strong in presence of the following observations. When Europe and the USA isolated Russia after the Crimean Annexation, and thousands of German energy companies stopped taking crude oil from Russia, it was China which came ahead and settled a 400-billion-dollar gas deal. This 2014 deal was signed between the Russian state corporation Gazprom and Chinese corporation-CNPC to ensure 30 years supply of gas to China at an annual supply rate of 38 billion cubic metres. This was a deal between the energy hungry China and a Russia looking for a major ally in its global political space. A gas pipeline was launched last year as a strategic part of this historic deal. One year after the Gazprom deal, Russia sold 24 of its Su-35 fighter jets and six of its S400 anti-aircraft defence systems to China for 5 billion dollars. These are evidences which prove the strategic proximity between Russia and China. Hence, to expect that Russia would go out of the way to align with India in SCO would be naïve.

India expects to set up economic links with the energy rich central Asia which is geographically closer than Russia. For that India needs a supportive Pakistan and a stable Afghanistan which is a utopia as of now. It is because Pakistan is a member and Afghanistan is just an observer in the SCO with its own security and peace issues. Therefore, not much can be expected from India’s participation in the SCO apart from presenting its concerns. Russia will just play a middle ground player to provide platforms for discussion in case of any issues between the SCO members without damaging its link with China. Recent hosting of meeting between Indian and Chinese delegations by Moscow to sort out the Ladakh-Galwan issue is symbolic of the Russian posture in SCO.