The Second World War ended with the USA being the only country in the world with the record of having used nuclear weapons in any war. At that point in time, most of the observers in the then-nascent field of International relations contended that the presence of the nuclear weapons had brought a certain degree of anarchy in the global balance of power and that the weapons might have the potential to scare countries away from war. The first argument was put forth by the ones who vouch for the inevitable human craze for power and identify themselves as the realists and the second argument was put forth by those who identify themselves as idealists and held hopes for cooperation in the post-WWII world.

As an immediate measure of an action plan, the Acheson-Lilienthal report was published by the US State Department on the control of nuclear energy in the international domain. This report had a thematic successor document in the Baruch plan, prepared by Bernard Baruch, an American political consultant, financier, and statesman. This plan envisioned control over the production of atomic power to that extent which would ensure its peaceful use by international exchange of scientific information. But, after the Potsdam conference, the growing clout of Stalin over the USSR and its satellite states and his push for research in nuclear technologies was worrying the dispensation in the USA under Harry S Truman. Hence the Baruch plan turned out to be inconsequential.

After that, the nuclear race between the USSR and the USA and its allies triggered a series of tests of nuclear devices. In 1954, the Castle Bravo test acted as a light on the fuse for the international community to take serious notes of the potential realistic perils of developing nuclear weapons. Technically, the test was successful but the yields generated in the tests were way more than predicted by the scientists, and since the winds changed on the day of the test, the nuclear irradiated particulate matters had fallout over the populated areas instead over the seas. The then Indian PM, Pandit Nehru, asserted that all tests should be brought to a complete standstill for the greater peace.

Subsequently, a series of test ban treaties arrived with the Partial test ban treaty of 1963 which banned all kinds of nuclear tests except those carried out underground, threshold test ban treaty of 1974 which banned underground nuclear tests with yields above 150 kilotons apart from previous restrictions and the Peaceful nuclear tests treaty of 1976. Among these treaties, the first one essentially elicited the development of the comprehensive test ban treaty which is not yet effective. Besides the steps taken in the direction to prevent tests, another international collaborative treaty has been there in the international domain known as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty which calls to prevent nuclear proliferation, promote disarmament and drive peaceful uses of nuclear technology under Articles I, VI, and IV. But there has been a long-term problem with this treaty.

India and Israel who have had traditionally problematic relations with their neighbours have not participated in this treaty, pressing their need to have nuclear weapons as a measure of deterrence. While India has declared about its nuclear weapons capabilities by carrying out tests twice, Israel has been silent in this regard. But the country’s capacity to have such weapons is an open international secret.

Neither the CTBT nor the NPT has been successful in slowing down the march of acquisition of nuclear warheads by the USA and USSR until the proceedings of arms reduction talks began between them. The number of ballistic missiles of strategic nature was frozen at their existing levels in the Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT-I) conducted in 1972. One of the outcomes of this talk was that any new submarine-based ballistic missiles would be added only if an equal number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and SLBMs are dismantled. The most important result this talk obtained was the Anti-Ballistic missile treaty of 1972 which limits the deployment of any antiballistic missile system by the USSR and USA. It foundationally allowed both the countries to deploy two ground-based fixed sites to protect a location which has an Intercontinental ballistic missile silo. Under this treaty, the two countries signed a protocol in July 1974 which reduced their allowed number of missile defences to half. This was to develop cooperation between the nations in terms of requirements of nuclear missiles for deterrence purposes and overall promotion of peace. It did not cover the warheads and strategic bombers leaving the possibility for the nations to develop Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) based warheads which they went for subsequently. The second phase of the limitations talks known as SALT-II capped the total number of the SLBM, ICBM, and strategic bombers to 2250 in terms of the number of delivery vehicles (silo for ICBM, launch tube for SLBM). This treaty went kaput when USSR invaded Afghanistan and as a result, the USA stopped taking inputs from SALT II talks.

In the decade of 80s, USA president Ronald Reagan announced the need for resumption of talks to reduce the nuclear arsenal by the only two superpowers of that time. He put forth the idea of another arms reduction talks which would dramatically reduce the strategic nuclear assets of the two militaries. There were many hurdles in that decade in this context; one of the prominent being the observation that the USSR would be needed to adjust to a larger extent to reduce its nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis USA. In 1991, George H.W. Bush and Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which put a ceiling on the number of the nuclear warheads and the ICBMs. Under this treaty, not more than 6000 nuclear warheads atop a cumulative 1600 ICBMs could be deployed. This was the most complex of the arms control treaty in modern times with the widest scope and ramifications. This treaty also faced the problems of taking ahead of the denuclearization process of newly spawned countries (from the 1991 collapse of the USSR) like Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine which had been part of the USSR. START II was the next phase of the talks finalized and signed between the George Bush (Sr.) and Boris Yelstin in 1993. It envisioned bringing down the number of nuclear warheads to 3000-3500 and banning the deployment of the MIRVs. This treaty was ultimately dropped as one of the consequences of the USA withdrawing from the ABM treaty. USA and Russian administrations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yelstin were working out a framework for START III which did not materialize due to the failure of START II.

Failure of the START II and the global hangover of the Cold war made the dream of a world with a lesser number of nuclear weapons appeared like a pipe dream. But initiatives taken by Bill Clinton’s successor George W Bush under the vision of taking the number of nuclear weapons at the threshold level just enough for national security gave birth to a new treaty-Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) of 2002. It brought a certain level of optimism in the global nuclear disarmament paradigm. This treaty set the limit of operationally deployed nuclear warheads in the range of 1700-2200. A bilateral implementation commission was set up to monitor the functioning of this treaty. Despite allegations of an absence of monitoring, it was largely successful and was followed by the New START treaty which limited the number of warheads to 1550 which can be mounted on top of 700 delivery systems like ICBMs, SLBMs, and Bombers. This treaty is still in force and will expire in 2021.

In 1987, a crucial treaty was signed between the USA and USSR under Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev which exclusively banned land-based short-range (500-1000 km) and intermediate-range (1000-5500 km) ballistic and cruise missiles.

Over the past few years, there have been increasing diplomatic, strategic, and cross-cultural trust between China and Russia. The dragon has been acquiring fighter jets and surface to air missiles (SAM) from its northern friend. This has been a cause of worry for the western observers who feel that China is striding ahead to fill the power vacuum left behind by the USSR. Hence, as a strategic reactionary measure under the current regime, the USA had withdrawn from the INF treaty in 2019. It had been reported that the Obama administration had informed Russia about violations of the INF treaty. Subsequently, the USA has informed Putin’s administration in Russia around 30 times about the treaty violations. The European allies have expressed their concerns about the USA withdrawal as the NATO umbrella was proverbially protecting them from any untoward aggression. This complicates the situation in the middle-east as the USA had already exited the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. Many suspect that this will usher a post-cold war age of arms race.

One can reflect on these developments through the lenses of the classical Realism vs. Idealism dyad as was touched upon earlier. It will lead one to conclude that the USA withdrawal from the INF treaty has proved again that the anarchy and the resultant requirement of security as espoused by the Realists reigned supreme. Claims by the USA that the Russian deployment of the 9M729 (SSC8) violates the INF treaty can be true since the actual missile range might be well above the upper limit of 500 km as disclosed for the missile. The Russians on the contrary claim that the US launch of the Mark 41 VLS system is in violation of the treaty. One can argue that the USA withdrawal was caused by the growing proximity of an unpredictable Russia which had jinxed the world in its Crimean annexation with an ever-assertive China trying to grab and hold over the South China Sea. There is always another side to the story. In 2018, the USA in its Nuclear Posture Review had presented an idea about a sea-launched cruise missile that might force Russia back into compliance mode for the INF treaty. But this might have had the opposite effect on the Russian military.

The experts who are favour of arms control have stressed over the necessity of the USA and Russia to utilize the Special verification commission set up under the INF treaty to sort out disputes in terms of stands of both the countries and supposed violations. INF treaty is a perfect example of a middle ground that can balance extreme armaments that are harmful to the overall peace and total disarmament which is not plausible given the anarchic nature of the international order and presence of certain countries where many powerful non-state actors are driving their agendas. Total absence of nuclear weapons as envisioned in the 2017 Treaty on prohibition of nuclear weapons can be described as too utopian as there would always be a need by nations to have a certain amount of leverage against external threats. But powerful nations like Russia and the USA must walk the fine line on the treaties like the INF treaty of 1987 which require keeping the arsenal below a certain threshold level. Achieving this requires going through the murky trepid waters of labyrinthine dialogues in bilateral diplomacy by the participating countries that are willing to forego some of their arsenal for global peace.