As the results officially affirmed Biden’s victory in 2020 election, the world is looking anxiously but with lots of hope towards the Presidential Transition. In the context of US diplomacy and its executed foreign policy, political scientists from across the world have generally identified the foreign policy adopted by the US under various Presidents as either in the pair of isolationist & internationalist or in the setup of idealism & realism. On a closer examination, there are actually four forms of foreign policy of the USA which go beyond the four aforementioned categorization silos. The various presidents of the US have followed among the following types or rather archetypes of foreign policy-Hamiltonianism, Wilsonianism, Jeffersonianism, and Jacksonianism.
The idea of Hamiltonianism is based on the thought of the first Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. This category of foreign policy believes in a strong central government which would promote a strong linkage in the market economy in the USA and a healthy trade on a global scale. The advocates of this school generally argue for free trade in international space so as to maintain a strong and healthy US economy. This category hinges on mercantilist approach and hence can guide towards the protection of Sea lines of communication, for which military deployment can be justified.
The school of foreign policy identified as Wilsonianism is based on the ideas espoused by the 28th President of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, who gave the famous 14 point speech as part of his war address to the Congress on April 2, 1917. In this speech, he had given the justification for the US entering the first world war to preserve democracy. This school of foreign policy had been instrumental in translating the domestic strengths of the US, like free trade, democracy & self-determination, open agreements, and others, into lines of action in the foreign policy. The advocates of this category will give more weightage to democracy and human rights with respect to trade and economy. The origin of this school is in the Protestant Missionary Social Gospel movement.
The notion of Jeffersonianism was born out of the idea of the third president of the USA, Thomas Jefferson. This form of foreign policy stresses to improve on the situations on the domestic front rather than promoting the ideals abroad. The Jeffersonians advocate a liberal capitalist economy at home by promoting a decentralized democratic government in the US. This form of foreign policy generally does not support the global cop or the Superpower role of the US. In case of engaging in an international crisis, the advocates of this category would rather go for delayed and calculated deliberations instead of right away committing American resources. This typecast prefers a libertarian isolationist approach with very limited intervention on a global scale, in a way that differs from the globocop method.
Jacksonianism, named after the 7th president of the US, Andrew Jackson, was precipitated specifically out of people or folk movement in the US. This school of foreign policy along with Jeffersonianism is the least understood or rather misunderstood archetype of foreign policy. They despise committing American soldiers and wealth to spread ideals and values across the world. Economic wellbeing and physical security of the Americans are of primal importance to the Jacksonians. This category has its origin in the people’s movement, driven by the Protestant Scotch- Irish people who migrated into Virginia, Carolinas. They later spread to Kentucky, West Virginia, and parts of Indiana and Illinois. The advocates of this category treat themselves as a class and they do not have any ideological demand from the government. They prefer social security for the working-class rather than free giveaways to the non-working poor. But, in matters of war, once the US has committed with soldiers, they prefer complete defeat of the enemy, instead of soft diplomacy.
The four lenses or moulds of the US foreign policy have guided various Presidents in implementing their world view using the various factors, political, economic, demands of the American citizens and the different demands of the international platform. Immediately after the conclusion of the second world war, US was at ideological loggerheads with the USSR. While the former espoused a world where trade and market would largely be determinants of the economic balance of power, the Leninists and Stalinists favoured enlarging the influence of the soviet version of socialism. This created a balance of power in the world between the two foes of cold-war.
Evolution of demands on US foreign policy
The role of US foreign policy fits in the global balance of power centrally as it was one of the only two Superpowers left after the WWII-US and USSR. USSR had been a combination of heartland and oceanic power with a vast barren area separating the European part from the Pacific coast. The geographical vastness separated the resources-rich regions from the oceanic front, which over the decades led to the condensation of nationalist sentiments in the satellite oblast regions in the east European region of USSR. Europe was getting help from the US in the form of the Marshall plan, which was felt by the satellite states in the west USSR. The influence of the USSR was checked from spreading in the Anatolia and Aegean over Turkey and Greece and their surrounding regions through the implementation of Truman doctrine which boosted the countries through economic support without involving the military too much. This to a large extent resulted in the breakup of USSR in 1991. Other important factors responsible for the Soviet collapse were the petroiska and the glasnost spearheaded by Gorbachev. The US was now left with the choice of letting the world be without a superpower to steer through uncertainty or to handhold it as a global power. The Yugoslav wars triggered by the ethnic differences saw the violations of the values for which the US had sent troops to Europe in WWII. After the fall of the USSR, the question of choosing between leading by action and seating back and watch placed itself before the foreign policy wonks in the White House. It was left upto the US to either get involved in world affairs more intricately or to leave them as they are.
Unlike in the 19th century, when the world order was more or less single-handedly maintained by the British with some help from other European powers based on superiority over seas, the situation was different in the later decades of the 20th century, where economic power apart from naval superiority took the centre stage. This responsibility through the course of events fell on US after WWII, and more prominently after the end of the cold war. This responsibility came with its own costs. The international arena is an anarchic order with an overall balance of power and many regional balances of power. US needed to weigh its benefits and costs to maintain the overall world order. The foreign policy of US was to provide a solution to this question whose answer would have spatio-temporal variation throughout the world through the years. The archetypes of the foreign policy were to give a format to this answer depending on the combined needs of the world and the US. One unavoidable fact of the cold war decades was that economically, the US had become the centre of the world. The superiority of the dollar in the world market made the US an inevitable dominant global player, especially after the Nixon shock of 1971, which cancelled the international convertibility of the dollar to gold.
The world and the US had witnessed in the interwar period that without some amount of hand-holding, the world order can go haywire, examples being the great depression, Nazi conquests in Europe, and the resultant holocaust. So, the US realized that the costs of isolation from the world affairs can not be always afforded, as dire results of issues like human rights violations and abrogation of sovereignty can spill into other domains like International trade which benefits all.
This evaluation of the requirements of the World (like peace, democracy, and economic growth) and US and the relative costs, capabilities, and benefits in an anarchic multilateral world determines what kind of foreign policy an administration in the White House would adopt. To some extent, foreign policy is also guided by the thinking pattern of the President in the Oval Office, the most prominent example being the period from January 2017 to October 2020.
Trends
In the nineteenth century, the US had enjoyed the benefits of the combination of Hamiltonianism and Jeffersonianism by largely following an isolationist trend in a world reaping benefits of trade and leaving the responsibilities of World power to the British. After the first world war, when the League of Nations was formed based on the Paris Peace conference through efforts and deliberations by the then US President Woodrow Wilson, that was the moment when the idea of Wilsonianism was born. That was a moment of a temporary intellectual victory of the notion of Idealism which was heavily criticized by scholars like EH Carr, a proponent of Realism, in works like ‘The Twenty years’ crisis‘. In the Interwar period (between the two World Wars), the US kept itself in an isolationist mode following the idea of Jeffersonianism, in terms of dealing with countries in Europe.
In the decades after the end of the second world war, the US foreign policy was mainly centred around countering the soviet influence in various regions of the world. It was marked mainly with detente, a normalization of relations with USSR, and a state of constructive ambiguity in the middle-east, both guided by Henry Kissinger. The state of constructive ambiguity was an ingenious use of language by Kissinger in settling treaties between parties in conflict, where the treaties would be inferred differently by the different parties. Examples were the resolution of peace after the Six-day war of 1967, and the Shanghai communique to work out the difference between China and Taiwan in the treatment of the One China Policy.
The end of the cold-war, was observed by many as the success of the Reagan administration, which had accelerated many of the military development policies which were kept in freezer by Jimmy Carter. The conclusion of the Cold War gave US the space to increase its economic footprint around the world. Consequently, the foreign policy of George HW Bush took the format of Hamiltonianism. Bill Clinton resorted to engaging with the world. In his inaugural speech, Clinton had stated about reaching out to the people to help build freedom and democracy, which echoed the Winsonian sentiments. He spoke about getting engaged when the conscience of the international community is defied, through peaceful diplomacy wherever possible and with force where necessary. It reflected an interventionist streak in his diplomacy. This was in the traditional continuity of the Centrist democrats.
Clinton’s term saw the denuclearization of east European and central Asian satellite states of erstwhile USSR- Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, increasing the membership of NATO over Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. He had decided on using globalization to drive the agenda of trade in the world. This was the Hamiltonianism in action in his foreign policy, whose pinnacle was the inclusion of China into the WTO.
The foreign policy of the next US president George W. Bush can be described as a combination of Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism. In his inaugural speech, he spoke about working for a balance of power which favours freedom, a touch of Wilsonianism, and he also mentioned about meeting aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. On the assertive militaristic side of the foreign policy was the tenet that US military strength and capacity should be beyond the reach of other nations, and that as leader of the free world, behaviour of US should be totally different from the others. The 9/11 came as a test of the resolve of the US policy of protecting its citizens. After, the attack, the swift deployment of forces on the ground in Afghanistan where the main mastermind OBL was suggested to be hiding, to avenge the loss of lives in the terror attack was symbolic of Jacksonianism. Given the shocking taste of 9/11, the claims that the Iraq regime was stockpiling WMDs rang bells with the Jacksonians, which led to the deployment of forces in Iraq. That led to the toppling of Saddam Hussain, but no WMDs were found. Wilsonianism was then used to make sense of the operations in Iraq. That led to the dimming popularity of Bush Jr, which set the entry of Obama.
The foreign policy of Obama which was given a rough shape during the electoral campaign was based on limiting the involvement of US troops on foreign soil and improving the democracy back at home. This fell in the archetype of Jeffersonianism, which does not support the global policeman role for the USA and its associated costs in the world. Obama in matters of foreign policy can be identified as a libertarian isolationist, involving interventionism only when needed. But examples like Syria, Libya, and exploration of the Arctic can be given in cases of interventionism. He preferred maintaining the global dominance of the US military by reducing the costs of war in the middle east which was started under his predecessor based on doubts about WMDs and Saddam’s link to Al-Qaeda, neither of which materialized. This was criticized by the Wilsonians. Obama stressed upon maintaining the role of US central in the fight against climate change by engaging with China and giving shape to the Paris accords of 2015 using help from John Kerry. Placing the burden of climate-diplomacy on the US economy was not suitable to the tastes of Hamiltonians who espouse the supremacy of America in dollar terms. But, that did not deter Obama from pursuing the tough Jeffersonian path which entails, under the neorealist model (Kenneth Waltz) the use of ordering principles, the functional definition of the states as international players, and the relative capabilities of nations to maintain the role of US as a normative guide rather than being a policeman.
Foreign policy of Trump
The foreign policy of Trump can not be technically categorized in any of the archetypes described above. It was almost entirely guided by the volatile and unpredictable personality of Trump. His way of thinking has been called Trumpism, which covers uncertainty and does not have a standard definition. His “MAGA” (Make America Great Again) slogan captures an isolationist tendency where the US does not take responsibility of securing order anywhere. His deal-making approach in foreign policy became prominent when he said in an interview that South Korea should pay one billion dollars a year for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system, which was puported to be protecting it from North Koean missiles. NSA H R McMaster had to cover that by stating that the President’s statement reflected the demands by the public in the USA of sharing of the burden of security costs with the regional allies. South Korea expressed its surprise as the bilateral deal which formed the base for setting up the THAAD had specified that the US would bear the cost.
Apart from the above features of the Trump administration, there was a notable case of the high turnover rates for the various offices, especially the NSA. Reagan had three NSAs, Clinton and George W Bush had one NSA each in their first terms, while Obama and George H W Bush had two NSAs, while Trump has had six NSAs under his watch from January 2017 till November 2020 election. Frequent changes of the NSA in the National Security council resulted in a hindering of performance, decreasing the expertise level, and ratching up the anxiety levels.
Bob Woodward, in 2018, had published ‘Fear: Trump in the White House‘, which brings out the impulsive decision-making side of Trump, in a framework of chaos which in certain cases amounted to a nervous breakdown of the executive branch of the US government. His problematic policy approach was complicated by the language of his rhetoric, which makes it hard to specify his exact approach apart from being a deal-maker.
What could be the foreign policy type of Biden
As the US is trying to grapple with the impacts of the resurgence of the Covid19 and the outgoing team of Trump who is reluctant to accept his defeat, Washington is looking forward to Joe Biden with hopes of bringing US foreign policy out of the turmoil brought in by the chaotic unpredictability of Trump. The outgoing President had a strong vocal dislike about intellectualism and was guided solely by the populist agenda without caring to listen to inputs given by experts in his own government. His nonchalance over withdrawal from the Iranian Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), the Paris Accords of 2015 or during the initial days of the Covid19 crisis had raised concerns and panics from multiple corners, as it had effectively taken US out of the leadership role on the global platform.
Biden will arrive as a President at a time that not only has seen results of numerous disruptions caused by Trump, but also holds many chances to rebuild foreign policy architectures from the scratch. The reactions and responses of relief from around the world were summarized by the former PM of Australia, Kevin Rudd when he said, “You could sense the unknotting of shoulders from Seoul to Sydney”. He said that Biden’s win led to the collective breathing of a huge sigh of relief. Julie smith, who is in the transition team of Biden, and had worked as Deputy NSA when Biden was Vice President, said in the foreign policy bureaucracy, the team is going with a bit of a clean slate, because the damage done by the outgoing administration has been severe.
The two most precious assets that Biden has are the vast experience and the factor of empathy. Given the tone of his campaign, the challenges in the form of the Covid19 crisis taking economic toll, withdrawal from Paris Accords and the TPP, a dismantled JCPOA, a weaker NATO, a more belligerent North Korea, a trade war with China, and a recent killing of an Iranian nuclear scientist are manifold and would take time to be resolved. During this Covid-crisis, Biden would also have to deal with the fact that Trump had abandoned the World Health Organization.
Joe Biden is most likely to take the combination of Jeffersonianism, and Wilsonianism. The Jeffersonianism would include fixing the damages done at home by making a decentralized government and by limiting the military costs in foreign lands. His experience in this regard in the withdrawal of troops from Iraq under the Presidency of Obama would come as a handy guide. As Afghanistan is moving towards a peace due to recent talks with Taliban, this would be a great chance for Biden to bring US troops back home. That does take into account the minimum number of troops to be kept as a measure of power gesture and bilateral security arrangements with multiple countries. The touch of Wilsonianism would be required, as he wants to fix the problem with the fallen apart Iranian nuclear deal and the Paris accords. Among the nuclear arms limitation treaties, only the New Start treaty is active which will expire in February 2021. Biden was instrumental in formulating the treaty which became effective on February 5, 2011 under the Obama administration. This experience will help him to get the world powers like Russia and probably China on a discussion forum to reduce the nuclear arms in the spirit of Wilsonians.
Another set of observers believe that Foreign Policy of Biden would be inclined towards libertarian interventionist. It is based on the experiences of Biden, and the selection of Antony Blinken as the Secretary of State and Jake Sullivan as the NSA-designate. Biden had voted in the favour of Iraq invasion and is expected to involve US more in terms of troops and defending American interests in various regions of the world. It is also predicted by this group of observers that Biden will treat protection-based alliance as subsidies to other nations at the cost of American dollars and that he would try to limit Russian influence in the Middle-East using help from the EU and negotiate with China to avoid costly trade-wars. Summarily, this group believes that Biden will probably resemble Bill Clinton in terms of foreign policy.
The Biden presidency offers hope not only to the US, but also to the entire world in terms of how it would pull the world out of the impacts of the Covid and a mangled economy. And, whether Biden takes a complete Jeffersonian path or an entirely Wilsonian path, a combination of them or something entirely different would be reflected in the inaugural speech on January 20 and during the first 100 days of his term.
The ideas of the archetypes are based on the book: “Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World” by Walter Russel Mead
